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THE FED OF THE FUTURE: A FRAMEWORK TO OPTIMIZE SHORTTERM LENDING PRACTICES
Emma Macfarlane & Karin Thrasher*

ABSTRACT
Underbanked individuals currently face significant risk when accessing short-term
credit. While payday loans are the least expensive short-term credit option when
compared to alternatives like overdraft fees, they can also have an extraordinarily high
cost of borrowing. Unable to pay the cost of the loan, borrowers often find themselves in a
vicious cycle that drives them further into debt. This Note sets forth a proposal as to how
payday loans can be better regulated to create affordable access to short-term credit.
Specifically, this Note advocates for congressional and Federal Reserve intervention in the
payday lending market.
This Note first analyzes the current regulatory environment for payday loans. It
concludes that the CFPB’s attempts to regulate payday loans at the federal level have
largely fallen short, while state attempts to regulate payday loans are threatened by
recent OCC rulemaking. Without intervention, underbanked consumers’ access to shortterm credit may be threatened by usurious payday lenders.
The potential for an unregulated market has created a need for federal intervention.
On this basis, the second half of this Note argues that congressional intervention in
setting a federal usury rate is not only justified, but necessary. This approach is not
without its difficulties; a congressional usury rate may drive existing lenders out of the
payday lending market for want of profit. Thus, to preserve efficient access to short-term
credit, this Note proposes that the Federal Reserve create a short-term lending framework
through the layered use of FedAccounts and FedNow.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States’ antiquated check settlement system has created a
banking crisis for Americans who live paycheck to paycheck. 1 The United
States uses an “automated clearing house settlement process,” which can
take three or four days to clear a check. 2 For Americans without savings,
this processing lag can be devastating. 3 The current system is designed
to “clear the money coming out of an account before the money that’s
coming into it,” which can result in “overdrafts and charged fees.”4
Consumers left in the lurch because of slow processing speed must
choose the lesser of three evils: overdraft fees, reduction of necessary
consumption and expenditure, or payday loans.5
Payday loans are a type of financial service that provide fast cash to
individuals who need emergency funding to cover unexpected
expenses, or to help pay expenses in between paychecks. 6 These loans
are offered across the nation on a state-by-state basis and, while they
1. See Aaron Klein, Why Don’t Checks Clear Instantly? Ask the Fed, BROOKINGS (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/why-dont-checks-clear-instantly-ask-the-fed/ [https://perma.cc
/MPY6-K9CM].
2. Katie Deighton, The Dark Truth Behind America’s Payments Lag, RACONTEUR (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.raconteur.net/finance/payments/payment-modes-usa [https://perma.cc/AXG7-WVQ5].
3. See Ted Knutson, Nielsen: Even Many High Earners Live Paycheck to Paycheck, FINANCIAL
ADVISOR (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.fa-mag.com/news/nielsen—even-many-high-earners-livepaycheck-to-paycheck-22704.html [https://perma.cc/Z8GD-MDT8] (explaining that one in four
families making $150,000 a year lives paycheck to paycheck, while one in every two families
earning below $50,000 lives paycheck to paycheck).
4. Deighton, supra note 2.
5. See id.
6. Jeannette N. Bennett, Fast Cash and Payday Loans, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Apr.
2019), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/page1-econ/2019/04/10/fast-cash-and-paydayloans [https://perma.cc/JM8Q-96TE].
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provide access to cash to underbanked populations, they are also
synonymous with alarming costs and predatory behavior. 7
On average, payday loans are made for less than $500. 8 The loans
come due within two to four weeks, with repayment generally coming
due on the borrower’s next payday. 9 To secure a payday loan, an
individual does not need a qualifying credit score or collateral. Rather,
the requirements are simple: a borrower must be at least eighteen years
old and have a valid ID, proof or verification of income, and either a
bank account, credit union account, or prepaid card account. 10 An
estimated twelve million Americans are thought to use payday loans
each year. 11 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the loans are used
disproportionately by underbanked individuals.12 The typical payday
loan borrower earns $30,000 per year, and fifty-eight percent of payday
loan borrowers have difficulty meeting basic monthly expenses. 13 This
gap in financing leads borrowers to use payday loans outside of their
marketed scope as a means of stopgap financing, with funds being
spent on recurring expenses like rent. 14
Payday loans work differently in theory than in practice. 15 In theory,
the loan is used as a stopgap and is promptly repaid once the borrower
receives their next paycheck. However, borrowers are often unable to
repay the loan and meet basic monthly expenses. 16 This imbalance
between monthly expenses and assets creates a vicious cycle: borrowers
must keep borrowing to meet their basic expenses, creating
dependency on payday loans. As a result, the cost of payday loans is
staggering. Most payday loan borrowers receive less principal than they
repay in fees. 17 To illustrate, the average payday loan borrower “spend[s]
an average of $520 in fees to repeatedly borrow $375.”18 Seventy-five

7. Melissa Horton, Payday Loan Statistics, LENDEDU (Jan. 15, 2020), https://lendedu.com/blog
/payday-loan-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/RB2L-P9D3].
8. Bennett, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. What Do I Need to Qualify for a Payday Loan?, CFPB (June 2, 2017), https://www.consumer
finance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-do-i-need-to-qualify-for-a-payday-loan-en-1593 [https://perma.cc
/CH3E-R5PZ].
11. Horton, supra note 7.
12. Bennett, supra note 6.
13. Payday Loan Facts and the CFPB’s Impact, PEW TRUSTS (Jan. 14, 2016), https://
www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2016/01/payday-loan-facts-and-the-cfpbsimpact [https://perma.cc/BE6L-BHQ5].
14. See id.
15. Kelly Anne Smith, CFPB Revokes Payday Lending Restrictions Meant to Protect Borrowers, FORBES
(July 7, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/advisor/2020/07/07/cfpb-revokes-payday-lendingrestrictions-meant-to-protect-borrowers/?sh=2008f79632be [https://perma.cc/W3PQ-HRR8].
16. Id.
17. PEW TRUSTS, supra note 13.
18. Id.
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percent of payday loans are borrowed by consumers who borrow eleven
or more loans in a year. 19
While the high cost of borrowing is certainly a concern for critics,
the widespread use of payday loans suggests that many consumers rely
heavily on the product. 20 Millions of American consumers have limited
options for short-term loans, and payday loans can provide critical
short-term funding for wage earners with steady employment. 21
Further, payday loans are frequently less expensive than other options
available to underbanked individuals, including bank overdraft
protection and informal lenders like pawn shops. 22 In the current
market, payday loans can fill the funding gaps for individuals without
access to traditional lenders.
The idea, however, that payday loans must remain unchanged to
meet the demand for short-term credit is erroneous. 23 The imagined
binary between the status quo and a complete lack of short-term credit
fails to consider several options for extending more favorable credit to
underbanked consumers. The failure to consider these alternatives
disproportionately impacts groups who are more likely to experience
harm from payday loans, including the financially vulnerable, the
elderly, the less educated, and the poor. 24 While some legislative efforts,
like the Military Lending Act, have protected vulnerable groups against
usurious lenders, there has been no successful comprehensive shortterm lending reform. 25
Part I of this Note addresses the attempts of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or “the Bureau”) to regulate the
payday loan industry and subsequent attacks on these efforts from
opposition groups and the Bureau itself. Part II predicts that litigation
over the constitutionality of the Bureau’s actions will continue,
potentially negatively impacting underbanked consumers’ access to
short-term credit. Part III offers a two-part solution in which Congress
works in tandem with the Federal Reserve to create a more favorable
lending environment and product for under- and unbanked consumers.

19. Smith, supra note 15.
20. Bennett, supra note 6.
21. See Todd Zywicki, The Case Against New Restrictions on Payday Lending 1–2 (Mercatus Ctr.
Geo. Wash. Univ., Working Paper No. 09-28, 2009).
22. Id. at 2.
23. See, e.g., id.
24. Press Release, Consumer Fed’n of Am., CFPB Rolls back Payday Loan Rule Just When
Consumers Need More, Not Less, Protection (July 7, 2020), [https://perma.cc/3VRY-XSYB]; see also
Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Advocs., Predatory Lending (2019), https://www.consumeradvocates.org
/for-consumers/predatory-lending [https://perma.cc/Y7SM-PEMW].
25. FDIC, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL V-13.1 (Sept. 2016), https://
www.fdic.gov/resources/supervision-and-examinations/consumer-compliance-examinationmanual/documents/5/v-13-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX7T-PG8G].
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I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 2017 PAYDAY LENDING RULE
One of the most recent attempts at comprehensive short-term
lending reform was the CFPB’s 2017 Payday Lending Rule.
Understanding the history of the 2017 Payday Lending Rule is crucial in
order to understand the gravity of the consumer protections at risk.
Moreover, when reviewing the history of the rule and its related
litigation, past is prelude. Landmark cases like Seila Law v. Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau inform this Note’s predictions about the
outcome of ongoing litigation against the CFPB.
The organization of Part I proceeds as follows: Section I.A details
the history of the 2017 Payday Lending Rule, which was originally
anticipated to diminish high-interest payday loans, 26 and reviews the
Rule’s three provisions, only one of which survives. Section I.B outlines
the existing threats to the Payday Lending Rule, with a focus on the
ongoing federal court case, Community Financial Services Association of
America v. CFPB. 27 Finally, Section I.C details the CFPB’s response to the
current litigation and evaluates the case’s status.
A. The History of the 2017 Payday Lending Rule
Under former director Richard Cordray, the CFPB found that the
debt traps created by payday loans forced consumers to choose between
“defaulting, re-borrowing, or skipping other financial obligations like
rent or basic living expenses such as buying food or obtaining medical
care.” 28 In response to these concerns, the CFPB aimed to eliminate
debt traps by putting in place strong consumer-oriented protections
and, on October 5, 2017, the CFPB finalized the 2017 Payday Lending
Rule (the 2017 Rule). 29 The rule covers certain types of closed-end or
open-end credit, 30 the most contentious being (1) loans whose costs

26. See Stacey Cowley, Payday Lending Faces Tough New Restrictions by Consumer Agency, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/business/payday-loans-cfpb.html
[https://perma.cc/N7W2-CZVT] (articulating that the CFPB anticipated that the number of loans
with an annual percentage rate (APR) greater than thirty-six percent would fall by nearly fifty-five
percent).
27. See generally Brief of Appellees, Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
Case No. 21-50826 (5th Cir. Dec. 15, 2021).
28. CFPB Finalizes Rule to Stop Payday Debt Traps, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-finalizes-rule-stop-payday-debttraps/ [https://perma.cc/DER7-76HL].
29. Id.
30. See 12 C.F.R. § 1041.3(b) (2020). This Note defines closed-end credit as a loan where the
borrower receives an upfront sum and is required to pay back the loan at the end of a set time
frame. Open-end credit is a pre-approved lending limit, with no fixed time for lapse.

522

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:2

exceed thirty-six percent per annum 31 and (2) loans that grant the lender
a leveraged payment mechanism, which allow the lender to unilaterally
initiate the transfer of money. 32 The CFPB claimed that the rule
prevented “loans . . . marketed heavily to financially vulnerable
consumers” from “plagu[ing] communities across the country.” 33 The
original 2017 Rule contained three sets of obligations imposed on
lenders: underwriting standards, reporting requirements, and the
Payments Provisions. 34
The first set of obligations, the underwriting standards, required
lenders to ensure that a borrower had the ability to repay a covered loan
before the lender issued the loan. The CFPB identified lenders’ failure to
reasonably determine that a consumer had the ability to repay the loan
as an unfair and abusive practice. 35 Further, the underwriting
standards mandated that lenders obtain verification of a consumer’s
income and a report from a national consumer reporting agency. 36 After
advancing the covered loan to the consumer, the lender was then
required to submit information concerning the loan to a Registered
Information System, thereby fulfilling the second set of obligations, the
reporting requirements. 37
The Payments Provisions—the only full set of obligations that
remain—stipulate that when a loan falls within the scope of the 2017
Rule, a lender cannot attempt to withdraw payment from a consumer’s
account after a second failed withdrawal attempt; doing so constitutes
an unfair and abusive practice. 38 Further, lenders are required to
provide consumers with a “payment notice” before making the first
transfer attempt and a “consumer rights notice” after two consecutive
failed transfer attempts.
Amid an ongoing political struggle for control of the CFPB,
President Trump appointed Mick Mulvaney as the interim head of the
agency in January 2018. 39 As a congressman, Mulvaney “received tens of

31. See 12 C.F.R. § 1041.3(b)(3); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1041.3(b)(1)–(2) (explaining other covered
loans).
32. 12 C.F.R. § 1041.3(c). This regulation explains that a lender has obtained a leveraged
payment mechanism if it has the right to initiate a transfer of money, through any means, from a
consumer’s account to satisfy an obligation on a loan. Id. A lender initiating a single immediate
payment transfer at the consumer’s request has not obtained a leveraged payment mechanism. Id.
33. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 28.
34. See Payday, Vehicle Title and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 12 C.F.R. § 1041.4–.5
(2017).
35. 12 C.F.R. § 1041.4 (2017).
36. 12 C.F.R. § 1041.5 (2017).
37. 12 C.F.R. § 1041.10 (2020).
38. 12 C.F.R. § 1041.7 (2017).
39. Chris Arnold, Under Trump Appointee, Consumer Protection Agency Seen Helping Payday
Lenders, NPR (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/24/579961808/under-trump-appointeeconsumer-protection-agency-seen-helping-payday-lenders#:~:text=Under%20Trump%20Appointee
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thousands of dollars in political donations from the payday lending
industry,” suggesting a close connection to the industry. 40 On January
16, 2018, the CFPB announced that it intended to “engage in a
rulemaking process so that the Bureau may reconsider the Payday
Rule.” 41 Subsequently, under Director Kathy Kraninger, the CFPB
released notices of proposed rulemaking indicating an intent to rescind
the underwriting and associated reporting requirements. The CFPB
justified its decision by arguing that rescinding these requirements
would increase consumer access to credit. 42 The majority of the 2017
Rule has indeed been jettisoned through agency rulemaking, increasing
the importance and scrutiny of the Payments Provisions of the 2017
Rule.
After issuing a final rule to delay the compliance date for the under
writing provisions and reporting requirements in June 2019, the CFPB
issued the Revocation Rule in July 2020. The Revocation Rule removed
three provisions of the 2017 Rule, including the underwriting standards
and reporting requirements. The discarded provisions included, first,
the obligation stipulating that lenders must confirm a consumer has the
ability to repay their loans before making the loan; 43 second, the
requirement that lenders verify the consumer’s income before a loan
transaction; 44 and third, the mandate that lenders furnish information
about the covered loan to the Registered Information System. 45 In
issuing the Revocation Rule, the CFPB withdrew its two previous
determinations that (1) under an individualized-risk standard,
“consumers do not understand the material risks, costs, or conditions
of covered loans,” and (2) “consumers do not have the ability to protect
their interests in selecting or using covered loans.” 46 The Revocation
Rule became effective on October 20, 2020.47 Although the Revocation
Rule repealed significant elements of the 2017 Rule, the Payments
%20Mulvaney%2C%20CFPB%20Seen%20Helping%20Payday%20Lenders%20As,delayed%
20implementing%20payday%20lending%20rules [https://perma.cc/2WXN-PRC6].
40. Ken Sweet, Financial Watchdog to Gut Most of Its Payday Lending Rules, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Feb. 6, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/north-america-us-news-business-ap-top-news2a095cc99a07432aba3f62bfb6bfe47d [https://perma.cc/2JUX-5UGL].
41. CFPB Statement on Payday Rule, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Jan. 16, 2018), https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-statement-payday-rule/ [https://perma.cc
/F8RJ-87JZ].
42. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Releases Notices of Proposed Rulemaking on Payday
Lending, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us
/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-releases-notices-proposed-rulemakingpayday-lending/ [https://perma.cc/3AQD-7QXW].
43. See Payday, Vehicle Title and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 12 C.F.R. § 1041
(2020).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5331 (d)(2)(A)).
47. Id.
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Provisions remain intact, 48 allowing payday lending to persist in the
consumer financial market with few safeguards. 49
B. Seila Law Places the Payments Provisions in Limbo
While the Payments Provisions have thus far survived the CFPB’s
rollback of the 2017 Rule, they remain threatened by the Supreme
Court’s holding in Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Seila
Law centers on the refusal of Seila Law LLC, a debt-relief services
organization, to respond to several interrogatories pursuant to a CFPB
investigation because, Seila Law LLC contended, the CFPB was
unconstitutionally structured. 50
Seila Law presented two questions for the Court: first, whether the
structure of the CFPB, an independent agency led by a single director,
violated the separation of powers; and second, if the structure of the
CFPB was found unconstitutional, whether the provision codifying it,
12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3), could be severed from the Dodd-Frank Act.51
Director Kraninger announced that the agency itself had adopted the
legal stance that “the for-cause removal provision of the Consumer
Financial Protection Act of 2010 . . . [was] unconstitutional.” 52 The
Court held that, while the “CFPB’s leadership by a single individual
removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance” was
unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers, the
removal provision was “severable from the other statutory provisions
bearing on the CFPB’s authority.” 53
Although Seila Law resolved the question of whether the structure of
the CFPB was constitutional, it raised other questions surrounding the
legality of the agency’s past actions and the impact of those actions on
regulated entities. 54 The CFPB has been proactive in affirming and
ratifying the 2017 Rule’s Payments Provisions,55 which was intended to
48. 12 C.F.R. § 1041.9 (2021).
49. Lawrence Kaplan, Sara Weed, Jason Cabral, Quinn Dang & Karin Thrasher, CFPB Issues
Final Rule Rescinding Payday Loan Mandatory Underwriting Requirements, PAUL HASTINGS (July 15,
2020), https://www.paulhastings.com/insights/client-alerts/cfpb-issues-final-rule-rescinding-paydayloan-mandatory-underwriting-requirements [https://perma.cc/6BG4-YQ6H].
50. Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2188 (2020).
51. Id. at 2183.
52. Letter from Kathleen L. Kraninger, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Dir., to Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker, House of Reps. 1 (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content
/uploads/sites/14/2019/09/Pelosi-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9CQ-T5VM].
53. Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2192.
54. Eric Goldberg, William Heller & Thomas Kearney, Impact of Supreme Court’s Decision in
“Seila Law, LLC v. CFPB,” JDSUPRA (July 17, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/impact-ofsupreme-court-s-decision-in-31036/ [https://perma.cc/TG2G-UZ86].
55. Payday, Vehicle Title and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 12 C.F.R. § 1041 (2020);
see also David Stein & Andrew Rubin, CFPB Finalizes Amendments to Payday Lending Rule, COVINGTON
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preserve the remnants of the 2017 Rule in light of the Seila Law
holding. 56 However, regulated entities have since questioned the
validity of the ratification. 57
Despite the agency’s commitment to staving off attacks, the
Payments Provisions are currently the subject of ongoing litigation in
Community Financial Services Ass’n of America v. CFPB (CFSA v. CFPB). 58 If
plaintiffs are ultimately successful in that case, the 2017 Rule will be all
but demolished, leaving little substantive federal law in place to regulate
payday loans or the conduct of lenders in this realm.
C. Community Financial Services Ass’n of America v. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFSA v. CFPB)
The organization responsible for the suit against the CFPB is the
CFSA, an advocacy group that seeks to “protect consumers while
preserving access to credit options and to support and encourage
responsible practices within the short-term loan industry.” 59 The CFSA
alleges that restricting payday loans would “hurt consumers’ financial
well-being.” 60 Further, the CFSA takes the position that, instead of
protecting these invaluable consumer financial tools, the CFPB
“virtually eliminate[d]” payday lending through the 2017 Rule. 61 In its
amended complaint, CFSA argues that the Payments Provisions violate
both the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the U.S.
Constitution. 62
CFSA sets forth two arguments against the Payments Provisions
and expressly reserves the right to renew their challenges to the
underwriting provisions should the Revocation Rule be set aside for any

& BURLING LLP (July 7, 2020), https://www.covfinancialservices.com/2020/07/cfpb-finalizesamendments-to-payday-lending-rule/ [https://perma.cc/MUS6-886D].
56. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Jeremy T. Rosenblum, CFPB Issues Final Rule Rescinding Payday Loan
Rule Ability to Repay Provisions and Ratifies Rule’s Payments Provisions, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (July 7,
2020), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2020/07/07/cfpb-issues-final-rules-rescindingpayday-loan-rule-ability-to-repay-provisions-and-ratifies-rules-payment-provisions/ [https://
perma.cc/7XQG-UYZS].
57. See Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 7, CFPB v. Navient Corp., No.
17-cv-00101, 2020 WL 4454932 (M.D. Pa. July 10, 2020) (arguing that in the context of litigation,
absent a legally sufficient ratification, the CFPB’s prior action’s must be dismissed because an
unconstitutionally structured agency lacks authority).
58. Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 18-cv-00295, 2021 WL
4132272 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2021).
59. About CFSA, CMTY. FIN. SERVS. ASS’N OF AM., https://www.cfsaa.com/about-cfsa
[https://perma.cc/LH92-9K2Z].
60. Amended Complaint ¶ 1, Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am., No. 18-cv-00295, 2021 WL 4132272.
61. Id. ¶ 2.
62. Id. ¶ 16.
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reason. 63 These arguments may represent a credible and “powerful
attack on the payment provisions of the rule” 64 and thus should be
analyzed with the presumption of appeal, regardless of the District
Court ruling.
First, the CFSA argues that the CFPB arbitrarily and capriciously
declined to repeal the Payments Provisions simultaneously with the
repeal of the mandatory underwriting provisions. 65 The CFSA contends
that the initial promulgation of the Payments Provisions was based on
the same unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices (UDAAP) theory
as the underwriting provisions. 66 When reconsidering the underwriting
provisions, the CFPB acknowledged flaws in the original 2017 Rule,
including evidence that the prior CFPB director had misinterpreted the
proper scope of UDAAP authority when issuing the 2017 Rule. 67 The
CFSA alleges that the Payment Provisions “rested on the very same
UDAAP standards that the Bureau had just rejected in revoking the
underwriting provisions.” 68 Accordingly, the CFSA argues that relying
on the same disallowed test should be deemed “arbitrary [and]
capricious” under the APA. 69
Second, the CFSA argues that the post-Seila Law ratification of the
Payments Provisions is legally insufficient to cure the constitutional
defects of the 2017 Rule. 70 The CFSA argues that the 2017 Rule should be
presumed to have constitutional defects because it was created by a
structurally invalid agency. 71 After all, as the CFSA contends, “an invalid
agency cannot promulgate valid legislative rules. . . . [and] [t]he
Bureau’s notice of ratification, promulgated without notice-andcomment rulemaking, did not and could not cure this constitutional
defect.” 72 Thus, the CFSA argues, the CFPB must promulgate the
Payments Provisions under a new “valid rulemaking process, which only
a validly constituted agency can undertake.” 73 In summary, the CFSA
posits that without a new rulemaking process, the CFPB’s ratification of
the Payments Provisions violates the Constitution because it gives
“retroactive legal force to the promulgation of [an invalid] legislative
63. Id. ¶ 56.
64. Jeremy T. Rosenblum, Trade Groups File Amended Complaint in Texas Lawsuit Challenging
CFPB Payday Loan Rule, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.consumer
financemonitor.com/2020/08/31/trade-groups-file-amended-complaint-in-texas-lawsuit-challengingcfpb-payday-loan-rule/ [https://perma.cc/JBP3-UXKW].
65. Amended Complaint, supra note 60, ¶ 6.
66. Id. ¶ 6.
67. 12 C.F.R. § 1041, supra note 55.
68. Amended Complaint, supra note 60, ¶ 106.
69. Id. ¶ 101; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
70. Amended Complaint, supra note 60, ¶ 11.
71. Id.
72. Id. ¶¶ 95–96.
73. Id. ¶ 11.
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rule.” 74 The CFSA concedes that the Bureau may be able to ratify
enforcement actions, but asserts that a legislative rule cannot be held to
the same standard. 75
D. The CFPB’s Response
The Bureau maintains that both of the CFSA’s primary arguments
are erroneous. First, the Bureau argues that any initial problem of an
invalid agency declaring a valid rule was cured when “a Director fully
accountable to the President ratified them.” 76 In order to support this
proposition, the Bureau cites several cases in which various appellate
courts have held that “ratification by an official unaffected by any
constitutional problem can ‘cure any Article II deficiencies.’” 77 Further,
if the District Court were to agree with the CFSA and invalidate the
ratified provisions, the decision would undermine, not fortify, Article II
executive power. 78 To bolster the argument that the ratification was
constitutional, the CFPB relies on agency theory to assert that the
Bureau itself “validly ratified the Provisions when its valid
agent . . . approved them.”79
The Bureau’s response to the CFSA includes several more avenues of
support for its position. One compelling rebuttal addresses the CFSA’s
statement that the Bureau acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ratifying
the Payments Provisions while simultaneously repealing the
underwriting provisions. The Bureau argues that the “repeal of the
[u]nderwriting [p]rovisions did not give rise to an ‘inconsistency’ in the
2017 Rule’s discussion of the [p]ayment [p]rovisions’ benefits and costs.”80
Rather, the repeal of the underwriting provisions did not impact the
Bureau’s consideration of the Payments Provisions.
In order to make a distinction between the underwriting provisions
and the Payments Provisions, the Bureau relies on two distinct
interpretations of its UDAAP authority. 81 In issuing the Revocation
Rule, the Bureau contends that it now rejects the individualized-risk
standard that the underwriting provisions were based on, but continues

74. Id. ¶ 97.
75. Id. ¶ 96.
76. Defendants’ Combined Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am. v. Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau, No. 18-cv-00295, 2021 WL 4132272 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2021) [hereinafter CrossMotion].
77. Id. at 10 (citation and brackets omitted).
78. Id. at 11.
79. Id. at 14.
80. Id. at 22.
81. Id. at 24.
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to back the generalized-risk standard that supports the Payments
Provisions. 82 When drafting the 2017 Payments Provisions, the Bureau
was concerned that consumers were not aware of the risk of multiple
failed withdrawal attempts. This premise relies on the generalized-risk
standard as opposed to the individualized-risk standard, which was
later rescinded by the Revocation Rule. Because the underwriting
provisions and Payments Provisions were based on different UDAAP
authorities, the Bureau argues that revocation of one and ratification of
another is not arbitrary or capricious. 83
In summary, both the CFSA and CFPB rely on differing
interpretations of the proper process for ratifying an agency action that
has been undermined by a court opinion. As a result, the CFSA and
CFPB disagree on the validity of the Payments Provisions in light of
Seila Law and the revocation of the underwriting provisions.
II. THE ANTICIPATED IMPACT OF CFSA V. CFPB ON PAYDAY LENDING POLICY
The controversy between the CFSA and CFPB embodies the tension
between the benefits generated from providing short-term credit to
consumers and the harms of maintaining the status quo. Both the CFPB
and CFSA have valid arguments. Although the District Court ruled in
favor of the CFPB by granting the CFPB’s motion for summary
judgment, a longer-term legal battle and appeal is now on its way to the
Fifth Circuit. In the interim, it is worth considering how the case’s
outcome may affect consumers. Section II.A details the impact on
consumers of the court-ordered stay of the 2017 Rule, which lasted
throughout the District Court litigation (and has been extended
through the CFSA’s appeal to the Fifth Circuit). 84 Section II.B outlines
the Bureau’s options should the CFSA prevail on the merits in the Fifth
Circuit. At best, the Bureau could start afresh with the creation of a
new, duly constituted version of the Payments Provisions; at worst, the
Bureau could be blocked from enacting such provisions altogether.
A. The Effect of the Court-Ordered Stay of the 2017 Rule
First, the Payments Provisions, which limit the ability of the lender
to make subsequent withdrawal attempts after an initial failed attempt,

82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 26.
See Evan Weinberger, Court Delays CFPB Payday Rule as Industry Challenge Continues,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 15, 2021), https://new.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/court-delays-cfpbpayday-rule-while-industry-challenge-continues.
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remain in limbo due to a court-ordered stay of the entire 2017 Rule in
November 2018. 85 After ratifying the 2017 Rule, the Bureau stated that it
would seek to have the Payments Provisions “go into effect with a
reasonable period for entities to come into compliance.” 86 This was a
compromise that some critics viewed as necessary in light of the
indefinite stay; 87 without such a grace period, lender advocates argued,
creditors could be put in the “untenable position” of being deemed out
of compliance with the Payments Provisions once the stay is lifted. 88
However, the Bureau has since clarified that, in its view, the reasonable
period for entities to come into compliance with the Payments
Provisions ended in August 2019. 89 Specifically, the Bureau argued in its
brief supporting its motion for summary judgment that:
[B]ecause of the stay entered in this case, companies did not
actually have to comply by the Rule’s original compliance date
(and do not have to comply yet)—but that leaves companies
with more time to come into compliance, not less. If some
lenders put preparations on hold in hopes that the Payment
Provisions would be invalidated before the Court ever lifted the
stay, that was a gamble they took. 90
If the CFPB prevails after the Fifth Circuit’s decision, covered lenders
who bet on a complete overhaul of the 2017 Rule will be forced to
execute an accelerated plan to bring themselves into compliance with
the Payments Provisions. This could result in “extensive programming
and operational changes” that may not be easily implemented. 91
Given the CFPB’s contentious reputation over the past decade, it is
unsurprising that the court-imposed stay will be held throughout the
appeal to the Fifth Circuit. This means that, for the foreseeable future,
consumers are borrowing within the status quo—namely, in a
regulatory field devoid of the Payments Provisions.

85. Cross Motion supra note 76. at 7.
86. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Issues Final Rule on Small Dollar Lending, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 7, 2020), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpbissues-final-rule-small-dollar-lending/ [https://perma.cc/L6XE-SLEZ].
87. See Jeremy T. Rosenblum, CFPB Does Not Seek Lifting of Compliance Date for Payday Loan
Rule’s Payment Provisions in New Status Report Filed in Trade Groups’ Lawsuit, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR
(Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2019/03/11/cfpb-does-not-seek-liftingof-stay-of-compliance-date-for-payday-loan-rules-payment-provisions-in-new-status-reportfiled-in-trade-groups-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/94LF-BHAF].
88. Id.
89. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, UNOFFICIAL REDLINE TO THE REVOCATION RULE’S
AMENDMENTS TO THE PAYDAY LENDING RULE § 1041.15(c) (2020).
90. Cross-Motion, supra note 76, at 22.
91. See Rosenblum, supra note 87.
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The stay affects consumers in three ways. First, consumers
continue to be subject to practices that facilitate patterns of long-term
borrowing and cyclical debt. Lenders are “first in line” to collect on their
loans directly from consumers’ accounts and attempt withdrawals
repeatedly with impunity. 92
Second, individuals who borrow payday loans more frequently are
disproportionately impacted by the absence of the Payments
Provisions. For example, staying the Payments Provisions
disproportionately affects Black Americans, who are 105% more likely to
take out payday loans than other races and ethnicities. 93 Without the
Payments Provisions, historically excluded communities cannot decide
for themselves how to repay their loans. 94 Without these safeguards in
place, short-term lenders continue to remove paychecks directly from
consumers’ bank accounts when they least expect it.
Finally, leaving the Payments Provisions in limbo
disproportionately
burdens
vulnerable
consumers
during
unprecedented market contractions, such as the economic downturn
during the COVID-19 pandemic, by giving predatory lenders more
leverage over the unemployed. 95 With annual interest rates as high as
400% continuing unabated, 96 the impact on low-income consumers of
nullifying the Payments Provisions cannot be overstated.
B. The Bureau’s Options upon Defeat
In the Fifth Circuit, the CFSA could plausibly prevail on any of their
legal arguments and all but eviscerate the 2017 Rule. If this happens, the
Bureau has several options. First, if the Payments Provisions are struck
down on constitutional grounds, the Bureau could reinstate them now
that the CFPB is considered a “validly constituted” agency under Seila
Law. 97 But this avenue is not without its drawbacks. The road to

92. SUSANNA MONTEZEMOLO, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PAYDAY LENDING ABUSES AND
PREDATORY PRACTICES 2 (2013), https://www.responsiblelending.org/state-of-lending/reports/10Payday-Loans.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BHJ-KLCU].
93. Pew Charitable Trusts, PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO BORROWS, WHERE THEY
BORROW, AND WHY 9 (2012) [hereinafter PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA].
94. Proposal to Dismantle Payday Loan Rule Would Harm Millions, PEW TRUSTS (Feb. 6, 2019), https://
www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/press-releases-and-statements/2019/02/06/pew-proposalto-dismantle-payday-loan-rule-would-harm-millions [https://perma.cc/8X5Q-EFD5].
95. See Yuka Hayashi, Rollback of Payday Loan Proposal Decried by Consumer Groups, Welcomed by
Banks, WALL STREET J. (July 8, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rollback-of-payday-loanproposal-decried-by-consumer-groups-welcomed-by-banks-11594238239
[https://perma.cc/A5F8MEYV].
96. Id.
97. Amended Complaint, supra note 60, ¶ 11.
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regulation is often hard-fought and time-consuming. A brief overview
of the CFPB’s rulemaking process underscores this point.
To initiate rulemaking, the CFPB must conduct research on the
issue in question. That research must be informed by “public input,
including field hearings, consumer and industry roundtables, advisory
bodies, and in some cases, small business review panels.” 98 It is
tempting to think that this process could be expedited since the 2017
Rule already underwent this extensive vetting process. However, due to
public pushback on the CFPB’s prior research methods concerning the
2017 Rule in general and the Payments Provisions in particular, 99 it
seems likely that the Bureau would start this process from scratch to
avoid any appearance of impropriety.
After the research component is complete, the newly proposed rule
would be vetted during a notice and comment period. This process
alone takes at least sixty days and is prone to extensions. 100 Even if the
newly proposed rule makes it this far, the CFSA could prevent its
enactment on alternative grounds. Such additional legal challenges
would only extend an already drawn-out process.
Alternatively, if the Fifth Circuit is convinced that the Payments
Provisions are arbitrary and capricious under the APA, that would put the
final nail in the coffin for payday lending protections under the Bureau’s
UDAAP powers. 101 If this were to occur, the CFPB would be compelled to
develop an alternate explanation of why the acts and practices covered by
the Payments Provisions are unfair, deceptive, or abusive. Given the
preexisting controversy surrounding the meaning of “abusive,” and the
exhaustion in this scenario of “unfair” under the revocation rule, the
Bureau may be hard pressed to construe a compelling explanation. 102
In either scenario, taxpaying consumers would be forced to fund an
expensive legal battle designed to eliminate short-term lending
protections. Currently, the CFPB is fighting to salvage the remnants of
the 2017 Rule and what once was an expansive framework for fortifying
consumer access to credit. Even if the agency succeeds in the longterm, preserving the Payments Provisions will not alleviate the

98. Rules and Policy, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (2020), https://www.consumerfinance.gov
/rules-policy/ [https://perma.cc/8SBW-ZVXE].
99. See Amended Complaint, supra note 60, ¶ 3.
100. STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 116TH CONG., ABUSES OF THE FEDERAL
NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING PROCESS 11 (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo
/media/doc/2019-10-24%20PSI%20Staff%20Report%20-%20Abuses%20of%20the%20Federal%20Noticeand-Comment%20Rulemaking%20Process.pdf [https://perma.cc/35PK-B6XV].
101. Or, at least signal the exhaustion of the possibility of such a CFPB rule based on UDAAP
authority.
102. CFPB Symposium: Abusive Acts or Practices, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 25, 2019),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/events/archive-past-events/cfpb-symposium-abusiveacts-or-practices/ [https://perma.cc/2VJV-6KLP].
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immediate distress that low-income consumers are facing today. The
need for accessible, short-term credit is particularly acute given the
financial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the aftereffects of which
will be felt for years to come. The clear distress in the short-term
lending market has created an urgent need for reform.
III. BUILDING A NEW FRAMEWORK: BEYOND HARM AVOIDANCE, TOWARD
FINANCIAL INCLUSION
The Payments Provisions of the 2017 Rule were intended to
“increase consumer protections from harm associated with lenders’
payment practices.” 103 This is a modest aim. One might expect a loftier
goal than harm avoidance from an institution that purports to “make
consumer financial markets work for consumers.” 104 This is not to say
that agencies like the CFPB play a trivial role in regulating practices that
may harm consumers, but it is to say that an effective consumer
framework requires more than just harm prevention.
This Note posits harm prevention as the first step in a two-part
framework of consumer protection from payday lending. The second—
and thus far missing—component requires confirmatory proactive
action to create financially inclusive lending options for consumers.
This second step fills the void left by usurious payday lenders and
negates one of the main counterarguments to the Payment Provisions:
namely, that to “target[] a critical form of credit for millions of
borrowers who are in dire need of it, the [practice of regulating payday
lending] would . . . severely injure[] the very consumers the Bureau is
charged with protecting.” 105 There are other ways to provide short-term
credit to underbanked consumers without saddling them with
contemptible loans, as this Part explores.
Part III proceeds as follows. Section III.A identifies an alternative
means of “harm prevention” analogous to the Payments Provisions and,
indeed, the 2017 Rule as a whole. This Section then argues that
Congress should exercise its authority to set a federal usury rate for
payday lending. Section III.B proposes an affirmative step toward
financial inclusion for under- and unbanked consumers who require
the services of payday loans. Here, this Note builds upon the proposed
FedAccounts feature of the Federal Reserve and offers a more
beneficent version of existing payday loans. These proposed loans (what
this Note refers to as “FedLoans”) would be facilitated through
103. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 86.
104. The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us
/the-bureau/ [https://perma.cc/M48M-4M3E].
105. See Amended Complaint, supra note 60, ¶ 3.
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FedAccounts and would have three defining features: (1) they would be
“real-time payments” 106 that are readily available for timely disbursal; (2)
they would maintain a competitive interest rate tied to the prime rate;
and (3) they would be available to all American residents, including noncitizens and undocumented immigrants.
A. Congressional Usury Rates for Payday Lending
Currently, payday lending is primarily regulated by state annual
interest rate caps. Recent developments in case law and rulemaking,
however, highlight that Congress must act immediately to set a federal
usury rate for payday lending. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC has had a
particularly profound impact on the anticipated regulation of payday
lenders. In Madden, the Second Circuit held that a loan that was valid
when it was originated by a national bank could become usurious under
state law if it was sold or assigned to a non-bank because federal
preemption would no longer apply upon assignment. 107 Further,
Madden supported the proposition that payday lenders were not entitled
to protection from state-law usury claims under the National Bank Act
(NBA). 108 Finally, Madden held that state law usury claims are not
preempted under the NBA when the lending party is neither a “national
bank nor a subsidiary or agent of a national bank” and when
“application of the state law . . . would not significantly interfere with
any national bank’s ability to exercise its powers under the NBA.” 109
Thus, under this framework, a payday lender is neither a national bank
nor an agent of a national bank and, as such, cannot use the NBA to
evade the state interest rate caps that regulate payday loans.
The Madden framework, however, is threatened by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC’s) December 2020 rule, “National
Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders.” 110 Under this
proposal, a bank will be deemed to have made a loan for the purpose of
the NBA if “as of the date of origination . . . [the bank] [i]s named as the
lender in the loan agreement . . . or [f]unds the loan.” 111 The OCC
promulgated this rule to clarify which entity is making the loans, and

106. See generally Letter from Aaron Klein, Fellow in Econ. Stud., Brookings Inst., to Ann
Misback, Secretary, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov
/SECRS/2018/December/20181221/OP-1625/OP-1625_121418_133277_428769914666_1.pdf [https://perma.cc
/QEV4-WZ7U].
107. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015).
108. Id. at 250.
109. Id. at 247.
110. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1031(b)(1)– (2) (2020). The OCC ensures that national banks and federal
savings associations operate safely.
111. Id.
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therefore what laws apply to the loans. 112 However, this rule may
override the fact-intensive balancing test that courts currently use to
determine which party is the true lender and what regulations should
apply. 113 In the context of payday lending, this rule will eviscerate states’
power to regulate payday loan interest rates; payday lenders will turn to
rent-a-bank schemes in order to reap the interest rate exportation
benefit of the NBA. 114 Under the OCC rule, the lending party would be
the national bank and, as such, state law usury claims would be
preempted under the NBA. 115
The new OCC rule, which expands payday lenders’ powers and
reduces their regulation, could be mitigated by a new presidential
administration. Indeed, the OCC is not immune from partisanship;
academics correctly predicted that Brian Brooks, the former acting
comptroller of the OCC, would be “out if Biden takes office.” 116 The new
comptroller has yet to be named. Although the Biden administration
might amend or revoke the December 2020 rule, the political pendulum
will continue to swing, and it is prudent to proactively combat
regulatory gaps whenever they arise.
The possibility that payday lenders will soon operate without even
state law restrictions underscores the urgent need for federal
congressional intervention. Congress must implement a federal usury
rate for payday lending to avoid the least-favored outcome of no state or
federal limitations on usurious lenders. By proactively establishing a
federal usury rate for payday lending, Congress can preempt rent-abank schemes while ensuring short-term credit access for underbanked
consumers.
Consumer advocates have already begun asking Congress to pass a
thirty-six percent federal interest rate cap for non-bank lenders in
response to recent rulemaking efforts by the OCC and the Federal

112. Id.
113. Id. § 6. Currently under the true lender doctrine, courts look at a multitude of factors
such as “(1) how long the entity named as the lender holds the loan before selling it to the third
party, (2) whether the third-party advances money that the named lender draws on to make loans,
(3) whether the third party guarantees minimum payments or fees to the named lender.” National
Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 44223, 44224 (proposed July 22,
2020).
114. See Jan Kruse & Lauren Saunders, OCC Proposal Would Turn State Interest Rate Limits into a
“Dead Letter,” Causing Explosion of Rent-a-Bank Payday Lending That Will Devastate Struggling Families,
NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (July 20, 2020), https://www.nclc.org/media-center/occ-proposal-wouldturn-state-interest-rate-limits-into-a-dead-letter-causing-explosion-of-rent-a-bank-payday-lendingthat-will-devastate-struggling-families.html [https://perma.cc/DY3L-NC5Z].
115. See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 11 (2003) (“[T]here is . . . no such thing as
a state-law claim of usury against a national bank.”).
116. See Anna Hrushka, Election 2020: What Should the Banking Industry Expect from Biden or
Trump?, BANKINGDIVE (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.bankingdive.com/news/election-2020-bidentrump-tax-cfpb-marijuana-cabinet/587489/ [https://perma.cc/9FPC-2BMN].
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Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 117 Congress is well within its
power to do so. Notably, under the Military Lending Act, Congress has
already established a thirty-six percent usury cap for certain consumer
loans. 118 Additionally, in late 2019, Illinois Representative Jesús García
introduced a bipartisan bill, the Veterans and Consumers Fair Credit
Act, which sought to extend the consumer credit protections provided in
the Military Lending Act, including the thirty-six percent usury rate cap,
to all consumers. 119 The proposal would not preempt stricter state usury
rates. 120 While Congress has expanded consumer lending protections by
changing federal usury rates, Senator Bernie Sanders and
Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez have suggested even more
expansive reforms in their proposed legislation, the Loan Shark
Prevention Act. 121 Under the Loan Shark approach, payday lenders
cannot charge an annual percentage rate that exceeds the lesser of
fifteen percent and the maximum rate permitted by state law. 122
These actions underscore an important point: state usury rates are
no longer an efficient means of regulating payday lending. Under the
OCC rule, payday lenders can circumvent maximum state usury laws
and take advantage of interest rate exportation. By setting a national
maximum interest rate, Congress could prevent payday lenders from
creating the rent-a-bank schemes that the OCC rule enables.
Congress could set a federal payday lending usury rate without
preempting state usury rates. Federal law can preempt inconsistent
state laws, as well as laws that impede federal aims. 123 However, given
the variety of payday lending usury rates set by states, not all state laws
will be more permissive than the federal law. If Congress sets a
maximum usury rate, states that elect to set a lower usury rate would not
be interfering with the federal government’s exercise of its powers and,
thus, would not be in violation of the Supremacy Clause. 124 In drafting
the proposed rate, Congress could use the language of Sanders’ Loan
117. MEMORANDUM FROM COMM. ON FIN. SERVS. MAJORITY STAFF TO MEMBERS, COMM. ON FIN.
SERVS., RENT-A-BANK SCHEMES AND NEW DEBT TRAPS: ASSESSING EFFORTS TO EVADE STATE CONSUMER
PROTECTIONS AND INTEREST RATE CAPS (Jan. 31, 2020), https://financialservices.house.gov
/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba00-20200205-sd002-u1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PNV-3QFQ] [hereinafter
RENT-A-BANK SCHEMES AND NEW DEBT TRAPS]. The FDIC is “an independent agency created by the
Congress to maintain stability and public confidence in the nation’s financial system. The FDIC
insures deposits; exaines and supervises financial institutions for safety, soundness, and consumer
protection; makes large and complex financial institutions resolvable; and manages receiverships.”
About FDIC, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov [https://perma.cc/44X6-9Y7Z].
118. See 10 U.S.C. § 987(b).
119. Veterans and Consumers Fair Credit Act, H.R. 5050, 116th Cong. (2019).
120. RENT-A-BANK SCHEMES AND NEW DEBT TRAPS, supra note 117, at 5.
121. See Loan Shark Prevention Act, S. 1389, 116th Cong. (2019).
122. Id.
123. RENT-A-BANK SCHEMES AND NEW DEBT TRAPS, supra note 117 (citing Barnett Bank of
Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996)).
124. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Shark Prevention Act to ensure that states maintain the right to
eradicate payday lending and consumers remain adequately protected
from egregious usury rates. 125
Finally, a congressional solution to predatory lending is practical
for two reasons. First, the variation among state payday lending
regulations creates uncertainty for consumers, which is difficult to
navigate. A Pew Research study on payday loans currently identifies
twenty-seven “permissive” states that allow single-repayment loans
with APRs of 391% or higher. 126 In contrast, fifteen “restrictive” states
have no payday loan storefronts at all. 127 Each of these circumstances is
problematic. Together, they evoke the old maxim: “pick your poison.”
Should consumers be forced to live without the option of payday loans128
or attempt to tread water in a regulatory environment that permits an
annual interest rate of 391%? A federal usury rate would provide the first
step in regulating these extremes.
Second, courts oversee payday lending practices with a light touch
and tend to intervene in only the most egregious instances. 129 In fact, far
from vindicating consumer interests, state courts frequently function as
a mechanism to maintain the stranglehold that high-interest loan
companies have on vulnerable consumers. Savvy lenders have started
using small claims courts to their advantage, using the levers of the law
to arrest borrowers in default and recoup the money they are owed—
plus interest. 130 Although it is illegal to jail a consumer for an unpaid
debt, predatory lenders have fettered out a workaround in which debtors
are arrested for missing a court date or for failure to respond to a court
summons. 131 The predatory cycle is completed with the aid of state laws,
125. See Loan Shark Prevention Act, S. 1389, 116th Cong. (2019) (“Nothing in this section may be
construed to preempt any provision of State law that provides greater protection to consumers
than is provided in this section.”).
126. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, STATE PAYDAY LOAN REGULATION AND USAGE RATES 1 (2012), https://
www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/data-visualizations/interactives/2014/state-payday-loan-regulation-andusage-rates/report/state_payday_loan_regulation_and_usage_rates.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E7H-8CWE]
[hereinafter STATE PAYDAY LOAN REGULATION AND USAGE RATES].
127. Id. The remaining eight states are classified as “hybrid” states which “[h]ave payday loan
storefronts, but maintain more exacting requirements, such as lower limits on fees or loan usage,
or longer repayment periods.” PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA, supra note 93, at 21.
128. But see After Payday Loans: How Do Consumers Fare When States Restrict High-Cost Loans?, NAT’L
CONSUMER L. CTR. (Oct. 2018), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday
_loans/ib_how-consumers-fare-restrict-high-cost-loans-oct2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AE2VM6MR].
129. See, e.g., McGhee v. Ark. State Bd. of Collection Agencies, 289 S.W.3d 18 (Ark. 2008)
(holding that a state law permitting payday lenders to offer short-term loans with rates exceeding
300% violated a state constitutional provision limiting annual interest percentage rates on
consumer loans to 17%); De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 422 P.3d 1004 (Cal. 2018).
130. See, e.g., Anjali Tsui, They Loan You Money. Then They Get a Warrant for Your Arrest.,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 3, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/they-loan-you-moneythen-they-get-a-warrant-for-your-arrest [https://perma.cc/67ZKYY9X].
131. See id.
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such as Utah’s, which permit creditors to recoup cash posted for an
individual’s bail in civil cases. 132 The current lack of judicial intervention
further highlights the need for a proactive solution.
B. FedAccounts: Introducing FedLoans
With a federal usury rate in place, consumers will receive better
protections from payday lenders who are hawking high-interest,
predatory loans. But this is only half the battle. Payday lenders are
motivated to issue risky loans because they offer the probability of a big
payday upon consumer default. A federal cap on short-term interest
rates will significantly diminish the probability of such payouts for
lenders. As a result, it seems likely that, upon enactment of the
proposed federal legislation, a number of payday lenders will exit the
business for want of profits. 133 This exodus will leave a significant
number of low-income consumers who currently depend on such loans
in the lurch as they try to bridge the gap between wage payments. Thus,
a comprehensive solution to payday lending must not only prohibit
usurious lending rates, but also provide consumers with a viable
alternative to payday lending.
Enter the prospect of fast, low-interest loans through FedAccounts.
FedAccounts, first suggested by Professors John Crawford, Lev
Menand, and Morgan Ricks, are consumer accounts for public use that
are held at the Federal Reserve. 134 The proposed system would permit
American
consumers
to
use
“government-issued
digital
currenc[ies] . . . in the form of central bank accounts,” a system that
would be “seamlessly interoperable with the mainstream payment
system, relying on technologies that the Federal Reserve has used for
decades.” 135 Although such accounts are currently a privilege reserved
for commercial entities, 136 the Federal Reserve is already taking steps to
make its services available to the general public. In August 2020, the
Fed announced a new interbank settlement service christened
“FedNow.” 137 While the service stops short of permitting consumers to
bank directly with the Federal Reserve, it is touted as “catalyz[ing]

132. See S.B. 159, 2014 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2014).
133. For example, within Arkansas (classified as a “restrictive” state with respect to payday
loans) no payday lenders operate under the state law. See STATE PAYDAY LOAN REGULATION AND
USAGE RATES, supra note 126.
134. See generally John Crawford, Lev Menand & Morgan Ricks, FedAccounts: Digital Dollars, 89
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113 (2021).
135. Id. at 113.
136. See id. at 116.
137. See Service Details on Federal Reserve Actions to Support Interbank Settlement of Instant
Payments, 85 Fed. Reg. 48522, 48525 (Aug. 11, 2020).
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fundamental improvements in the nation’s payment system,” allowing
“individuals and businesses to conduct and complete payments almost
immediately, around the clock, every day of the year and provide a
receiver with access to funds in seconds.” 138
This Note’s proposed solution would require a layering of
technological innovation. With the realization of FedAccounts, the
operational advantages of FedNow could be applied to consumer
accounts. 139 The FedAccounts program itself could offset certain
conditions that cause consumers to turn to payday loans in the first
place. 140 Real-time payment clearances would eliminate the delays that
force consumers to borrow high-interest funds to support themselves
between paychecks.141 The program could also lessen reliance on
prepaid debit cards and their accompanying fees and service
interruptions, factors that also lead to the use of payday loans.142
Finally, the FedAccounts program could be used to facilitate real-time,
low-interest loans to fill the gap created by the existing payday lending
framework.
Layering FedAccounts with FedNow to create FedLoans would
effectively leverage technology to better serve consumers in need of
short-term loans. This solution is different from proposals for a public
postal banking option. 143 Importantly, this Note’s proposal envisions
FedLoans as a gap-filling measure designed to mitigate the potential
negative impacts of limiting usury, not as a public option designed to
compete with private companies. Further, a United States Postal
Service bank would enter a financial services environment
characterized by digitalization and proficiency. 144 Focusing on a brickand-mortar solution may miss demographics that are early adopters of
technology, including forty percent of unbanked individuals.145 Besides

138. Id. at 48522–23.
139. Crawford, Menand, and Ricks also suggest this eventuality within their proposal,
advocating for real time payments between FedAccount holders. See Crawford et al., supra note 134,
at 122–23, 125–130.
140. See infra Introduction.
141. See Aaron Klein, Understanding Non-Prime Borrowers and the Need to Regulate Small Dollar and
“Payday” Loans, BROOKINGS (May 19, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/understanding-nonprime-borrowers-and-the-need-to-regulate-small-dollar-and-payday-loans/ [https://perma.cc/
4PYD-EMU9]; see also Crawford et al., supra note 134, at 122–23.
142. Crawford et al., supra note 134, at 126.
143. See Mehrsa Baradaran, Credit, Morality, and the Small-Dollar Loan, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 64, 112 (2020).
144. Marc Joffe, Progressive ‘Postal Banking’ Proposal: A Solution in Search of a Problem, NAT’L REV.
(May 6, 2021, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/05/progressive-proposal-forpostal-banking-a-solution-in-search-of-a-problem/ [https://perma.cc/Y92X-74LW].
145. See Peter Conti-Brown, Why the Next Big Bank Shouldn’t Be the USPS, BROOKINGS (May 31,
2018); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., CONSUMERS AND MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 2016
(2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/consumers-and-mobile-financial-servicesreport-201603.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRM2-FLFL].
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lagging in technology, a public postal banking option would “put the
livelihoods of many [financially vulnerable] Americans in the hands of a
government agency with zero experience in underwriting loans and
that cannot even balance its own books while putting taxpayers at
risk.” 146 While leveraging the Postal Service’s expansive network to
provide a public banking option is a worthy goal, FedAccounts’ ability to
offer financial stability, speedy and efficient payment, monetary policy
transmission, and regulatory streamlining makes FedLoans a more
modern, efficient solution.
Our proposal also departs from the FedAccounts scheme envisioned
by Crawford, Menand, and Ricks, which does not entail the provision of
loans. As noted at the outset of their proposal, “FedAccount would not
be a lending program. The Fed would not provide credit directly to
individuals or businesses.” 147
The rest of this Section defends this Note’s divergence from the
original FedAccounts proposal. Instead of merely integrating
FedAccounts with a consumer lending program, this Note advocates for
the inclusion of a lending framework within the Federal Reserve. Three
necessary components comprise this framework: first, payments would
have to be distributed in “real time”148 and be readily available for timely
disbursal; second, loans would be required to maintain a competitive
interest rate tied to the prime rate; and third, loans would have to be
available to all American residents, including non-citizens and
undocumented immigrants.
1. FedAccounts as a Lending Program
The iteration of FedAccounts proposed by Professors Crawford,
Menand, and Ricks does not function as a lending program. The
authors readily acknowledge the limitations of their proposed
program’s ability to ameliorate the consumer liquidity crisis, noting
that “FedAccount, in and of itself, admittedly is not a robust response to
these household credit needs.” 149 The authors’ solution to payday
lending is instead an integrated system of postal banking, whereby the
FedAccount program could host the branch services of postal banking,
but the small-dollar loans would be made through a service separate
and apart from the central bank. 150 In sum, the authors envision
146. Rebeca Romero Rainey, Postal Banking Should Be a Dead Letter, AM. BANKER (May 7, 2018,
9:58 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/postal-banking-should-be-a-dead-letter
[https://perma.cc/8KWF-HEBT].
147. Crawford et al., supra note 134, at 123.
148. See generally Letter from Aaron Klein, supra note 106.
149. Crawford et al., supra note 134, at 159.
150. Id. at 158–59.
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FedAccount not as a consumer lending program, but as operationally
and “philosophically harmonious” with such initiatives. 151 The authors
present a number of reasons for this separation of powers; this Note
addresses their strongest points and other reasonable objections to the
FedLoans program.
First, the authors note: “[We have] reservations about putting
government agencies, whether the Fed or the postal service, in the smalldollar debt collection business. . . . [T]here are strong reasons for
outsourcing individualized portfolio allocation decisions in lending
markets to member banks.”152 The authors go on to argue that this
outsourcing does not necessarily entail a loss of control and that the
Federal Reserve could impose certain conditions on banks’ membership in
the FedAccount program, such as compliance with credit distribution
requirements.153
Relying on commercial banks to provide small-dollar payday loans
is technically feasible, but it does not guarantee that consumers will be
protected from predatory lending. In fact, this arrangement has already
been tested. Before OCC and FDIC regulations put a stop to the practice
in 2013, certain banks did double-duty as payday lenders, albeit with
more reliable methods of ensuring a return on their loans. 154 At the
“peak” of the practice in 2013, six banks were making short-term loans
with APRs between 225% and 300%. 155 Banks’ methods of ensuring that
loans were repaid mimicked payday lenders’ approach to recouping
their cash—the only difference was that the banks could intercept
clients’ wages before their paychecks hit their accounts. 156 When OCC
and FDIC guidance limited the most predatory aspects of the practice
in 2013, the banks abandoned their role as payday lenders. 157
With the elimination of non-bank payday lenders, commercial
banks would have to voluntarily fill the void. This presents numerous
problems. First, issuing short-term loans to low-income customers is a
high-risk, low-reward practice. 158 The reputational risks, fears of
customer default, and limits on interest rates make commercial banks
151. Id. at 158.
152. Id. at 159–60.
153. Id. at 160.
154. Such banks included Wells Fargo, US Bank, Regions Bank, Fifth Third Bank, the Bank of
Oklahoma, and Guaranty Bank. Rebecca Borné, Been There; Done That: Banks Should Stay Out of
Payday Lending, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 2 (July 2017), https://www.responsiblelending.org
/sites/dfault/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl-bank-payday-issue-jul2017.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/DY8T-MNQA].
155. Id. at 1.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See Sarah Connelly, Why Don’t Banks Offer Payday Loans?, CASHFLOAT (Dec. 15, 2021),
https://www.cashfloat.co.uk/blog/money-borrowing/banks-payday-loans/ [https://perma.cc/A23HMPFK].
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apprehensive to offer these services. 159 This is one reason why public
banks are better equipped than private commercial banks to furnish
short-term loans. Second, when commercial banks do choose to
provide such loans, consumers with low or no credit scores are
frequently deemed ineligible. 160 This is undesirable, as it is exactly these
consumers who are most in need of the short-term loans. 161 Finally, this
model is inefficient. Even assuming that commercial banks and credit
unions do decide to issue short-term loans, the banks’ financial
products will need to be developed and then approved by the OCC,
FDIC, and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 162—and
approval of such programs is just the beginning of the process. These
programs would require continuous oversight to ensure banks are
complying with the law and treating customers equitably. A better
approach is to centralize the public lending process using the
FedAccount model, with the Fed serving as the loan originator.
Critics may raise additional concerns with a program such as
FedLoans. If the Fed lends directly to consumers, it must eventually
collect on those loans. This raises the prospect of the Fed appearing in
court to recoup outstanding principal and interest payments and being
directly susceptible to a high rate of consumer default. 163 One may
contend that this impermissibly broadens the mandate of the Fed and
that it is precisely these commercial activities which are best left to
private actors and the market.
These objections are well-noted and conform with the traditional
conception of the Fed and its duties. However, recent practices
underpinned by economic theory demonstrate that the Fed is gradually
moving away from this conventional construction and embracing a new,
consumer-oriented role within the U.S. economy. FedNow, in providing

159. Id.; see also Standards Needed for Safe Small Installment Loans from Banks, Credit Unions, PEW
TRUSTS (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/02
/standards-needed-for-safe-small-installment-loans-from-banks-credit-unions [https://perma.cc
/23BL-JZ5H]. But see Ann Carrns, Banks Urged to Take on Payday Lenders with Small, Lower-Cost Loans,
N.Y. TIMES: YOUR MONEY (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/your-money
/banks-payday-loans.html [https://perma.cc/TY9E-546V].
160. See Standards Needed for Safe Small Installment Loans from Banks, Credit Unions, supra note 159.
161. Kirsten Wysen, Why Credit Scores and Payday Lending Matter for Health, OPEN SOURCE SOLS.
(Oct. 2019), https://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/credit-scores-payday-lendingmatter-to-health.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CYN-VAWE].
162. Standards Needed for Safe Small Installment Loans from Banks, Credit Unions, supra note 159.
163. See generally Susanna Montezemolo & Sarah Wolff, Payday Mayday: Visible and Invisible
Payday Lending Defaults, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Mar. 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2605972. Montezemolo and Wolff explain that nearly half of payday loan
borrowers default within two years. Id. While eliminating predatory usury rates may lower this
figure, it is prudent to expect short-term lending to continue to create some level of litigation risk.
Id.
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consumers and businesses access to an instant payment infrastructure, 164
is one way that the Fed acts as an agent of monetary policy. Moreover, the
2020 pandemic has underscored the Fed’s willingness to provide critical
payments to U.S. households using appropriated federal funds. 165
Further, in a March 2020 emergency action, the Fed established a
lending facility to “unclog” the short-term lending market: businesses
were permitted to issue commercial paper—what some economists
describe as an “IOU” to the Fed—to cover short-term commercial costs
such as payroll. 166 These actions show the Fed’s clear willingness to
embrace a consumer-oriented role.
Further, some critics are also concerned that the FedLoans program
will increase the national debt. When a nation’s economy is performing
well, so the argument goes, the government has a greater opportunity
to “pay down the national debt, cut taxes, shore up entitlements or
pursue new spending programs.” 167 In contrast, national debt is
frequently viewed as impeding economic growth and weakening the
economy. 168 Proponents of this view might, in turn, position FedLoans
as an expensive drain on government resources that heightens the risk
of hyperinflation.
However, apprehension concerning FedLoans’ contribution to the
national debt is misplaced, as this Note demonstrates in theory and
practice. First, as posited by Modern Monetary Theory (MMT),
increased government debt from the FedLoans program will not cause
the economy to collapse, as some critics fear. 169 MMT instead positions
national debt merely as “money the government put into the economy

164. Lael Brainard, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., The Future of Retail
Payments in the United States at the FedNow Service Webinar, Washington D.C. (Aug. 6, 2020),
https://www.bis.org/review/r200807a.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5FA-2MQ4].
165. See id.; Andrew T. Budreika, Julia Frost-Davies & Ian M. Wenniger, CARES Act and Federal
Reserve Offer Economic Assistance to Stabilize US Economy, MORGAN LEWIS: LAWFLASH (July 29, 2020),
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2020/07/cares-act-and-federal-reserve-offer-economicassistance-to-stabilize-us-economy-cv19-lf [https://perma.cc/75WJ-UELY].
166. Associated Press, Fed Will Buy Short-Term Loans to Try to Ease Flow of Credit, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
17, 2020, 9:28 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-03-17/fed-will-buy-shortterm-loans-to-try-to-ease-flow-of-credit [https://perma.cc/5SE2-PBN8].
167. Dylan Matthews, Modern Monetary Theory Is an Unconventional Take on Economic Strategy,
WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/modern-monetary-theoryis-an-unconventional-take-on-economic-strategy/2012/02/15/gIQAR8uPMR_story.html.
168. Hans G. Despain, Book Review: The Deficit Myth: Modern Monetary Theory and the Birth of the
People’s Economy by Stephanie Kelton, LONDON SCH. ECON. (June 22, 2020), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk
/lsereviewofbooks/2020/06/22/book-review-the-deficit-myth-modern-monetary-theory-and-thebirth-of-the-peoples-economy-by-stephanie-kelton/ [https://perma.cc/KWE5-YUTN].
169. See The Fiscal & Economic Impact, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND. https://www.pgpf.org/
the-fiscal-and-economic-challenge/fiscal-and-economic-impact [https://perma.cc/CG36-3RQZ]
(describing concerns about the negative impact of increased government debt). For an extensive
discussion dispelling the myths surrounding the dangers of national deficits, see STEPHANIE
KELTON, THE DEFICIT MYTH (2020).
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and didn’t tax back.” 170 This comports with recent recession trends. For
example, scholars such as Atif Mian and Amir Sufi have convincingly
argued that the Great Recession was caused by the uneven accretion of
household debt between 2000 and 2006.171 When the housing bubble
popped, the debt was disproportionately distributed to economically
unstable communities which subsequently cut back on spending en
masse. 172 Mian and Sufi posit that had the distribution of debt been
allocated more evenly across the economy, the decrease in consumer
spending and subsequent recession would have been less devastating.173
They further argue that the government could end the boom-and-bust
cycle by moving away from policies that encourage the accumulation of
national consumer debt. 174 By providing consumers with the means to
pay off their debts, the FedLoans program may not only end the cycle of
consumer debt but also reduce the severity of recessions.
Second, recent experimentation with vast federal spending and
lending programs should dispel concerns surrounding FedLoans’
contributions to the national deficit. One need only turn to the federal
programs created in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The $2.2
trillion poured into the U.S. economy by such programs—including those
that allowed for partially or fully forgivable loans 175—did not instigate
“runaway inflation,” as some critics feared. 176 Instead, programs like the
CARES Act have had an overwhelmingly positive impact on many aspects
of the U.S. economy. For example, such programs have increased
consumer spending for low-income families and in low-income
neighborhoods; 177 helped increase GDP growth to 33.1% (in contrast to the
Survey of Professional Forecasters’ median prediction of 19.1% growth);
limited unemployment rates and temporary layoffs; and helped keep

170. Deborah D’Souza, Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 23, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/modern-monetary-theory-mmt-4588060 [https://perma.cc/FKH8FRR8].
171. See generally ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE
GREAT RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN 84–88, 91–93 (2014).
172. See generally id.
173. Id. at 88; see also Heather Boushey, It Wasn’t Household Debt That Caused the Great Recession,
ATLANTIC (May 21, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/house-of-debt
/371282/ [https://perma.cc/4NPY-NLTK].
174. MIAN & SUFI, supra note 171, at 85–93.
175. See, e.g., CARES Act Stimulus for Small Businesses, THOMSON REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2020),
https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/resources/covid-19-small-business-resources/cares-actstimulus-for-small-business.html [https://perma.cc/KN95-HWG9].
176. James K. Galbraith, Who’s Afraid of MMT?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Dec. 23, 2020), https://
www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/why-central-bankers-fear-modern-monetary-theory-byjames-k-galbraith-2020-12 [https://perma.cc/XX5Z-9UA9].
177. Kenan Insight, Who CARES? Assessing the Impact of the CARES Act, KENAN INST. PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE (July 15, 2020), https://kenaninstitute.unc.edu/kenan-insight/who-cares-assessingthe-impact-of-the-cares-act [perma.cc/8Z5S-6Db6].
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commercial bankruptcy filings below pre-pandemic levels. 178 The
achievements of the CARES Act prove what MMT posits: federal
programs that contribute to national deficits are not intrinsically
undesirable. Rather, such programs’ contributions to economic
stability and the national debt balance each other out. With the right
programs, deficits, such as the potential deficit created by FedLoans,
can be enormously helpful for both sustaining a national economy and
improving the lives of those within it.
2. Features of the FedLoans Program
The implementation of a federal program for short-term loans from
the Federal Reserve would be an enormously technical feat and require
extensive economic analyses. These considerations are valid yet beyond
the scope of this proposal. Instead, this Note lays the groundwork for
such a program and identifies key features which will fill the gap created
by the elimination of usurious payday loans. Three components
characterize a successful program: real-time payments; an interest rate
tied to the prime rate; and availability to all American residents,
including non-citizens and undocumented immigrants.
The distribution of payments in real-time imitates one of the most
attractive features of payday loans themselves. Whereas payday loans
can be processed in thirty minutes or less, a personal loan can take days
to process. 179 This is often too long for individuals who need to bridge a
cash-flow shortage immediately or are otherwise living paycheck-topaycheck. 180 Moreover, FedLoans should allow for fourteen-day
principal rollovers (or taking out a new loan). 181 The CFPB’s research
suggests that loan renewal rates are markedly consistent across states,
with consumers renewing eighty-two percent of payday loans within
fourteen days. 182 To avoid rampant abuse, the Fed could follow the
practice that many states have already adopted. This practice restricts
loan rollover to a limited time period after procuring the first loan,
reducing the possibility of vicious cyclical debt. 183
178. Michael R. Strain, Washington’s Stimulus Triumph Remains Underrated, BLOOMBERG OP.
(Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small-business/washingtonsstimulus-triumph-remains-underrated/2020/11/24/f138bac8-2e50-11eb-9dd6-2d0179981719
_story.html [perma.cc/Q7FV-GLD4].
179. Zina Kumok, Payday Loans vs. Personal Loans: What’s the Difference?, EARNEST (Mar. 31,
2020), https://www.earnest.com/blog/payday-loans-vs-personal-loans/ [https://perma.cc/59L3-EFWT].
180. See generally KATHLEEN BURKE, JONATHAN LANNING, JESSE LEARY & JIALAN WANG, CFPB OFF.
OF RSCH., CFPB DATA POINT: PAYDAY LENDING (2014), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403
_cfpb_report_payday-lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2U7-HP6X] [hereinafter CFPB DATA POINT].
181. See id.
182. See id. at 9.
183. See id. at 7.

WINTER 2022]

The Fed of the Future

545

The second key feature of the proposed FedLoans program is a
competitive interest rate tied to the prime rate, the index used to
determine interest rates for consumer loans. 184 Restricting interest
rates on FedLoans would ensure that consumers do not pay more in fees
than they receive in principal. Research shows that consumers’ payday
loan sequences progressively increase in dollar amount, in part to cover
the predatory interest rates associated with payday loans. 185 Each
renewal incurs higher fees. 186 Maintaining a competitive interest rate
tied to the prime rate not only eases dependence on payday loans, but
also guarantees that consumers are getting a fair rate that corresponds
with economic conditions. 187 For example, because the federal rate
fluctuates based on the economy, low-income individuals who are likely
to be hit hardest during recessions—such as the economic downturn
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic—will be able to receive fast, lowinterest loans when they need them most. A 2015 study by the Federal
Reserve exploring how it might provide fixed rate loans indicates that
most of the costs associated with financing small personal loans are
fixed. 188 The study concludes that private payday loan companies may
charge high interest rates “to provide sufficient revenue to cover the
costs of providing such loans.” 189 Because the Fed already absorbs the
overhead costs of financing loans and subsequent charges are “not
sensitive to loan amount,” 190 the Fed has little incentive to set high
interest rates. Finally, tying the interest rate to the prime rate could
eliminate what is left of the “loan shark problem.” 191 If the Fed sets a
competitive interest rate that is rarely available to payday loans users,
the high demand will preempt reliance on high-interest commercial
lenders.

184. For a detailed explanation of the prime rate, see James Chen, Prime Rate, INVESTOPEDIA
(June 30, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/primerate.asp [perma.cc/62ZY-3E98]
(“The prime rate is the interest rate that commercial banks charge their most creditworthy
corporate customers. The federal funds overnight rate serves as the basis for the prime rate, and
prime serves as the starting point for most other interest rates.”).
185. See CFPB DATA POINT, supra note 180, at 16.
186. Payday Loans, Auto Title Loans, and High-Cost Installment Loans: Highlights from CFPB
Research, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 2, 2016), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f
/documents/Payday_Loans_Highlights_From_CFPB_Research.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK5E-3YNR].
187. Alexandria White, How the Prime Rate Works and How It Affects You, CNBC (Sept. 30, 2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/select/prime-interest-rates/ [https://perma.cc/E9VU-N22E].
188. See Lisa Chen & Gregory Elliehausen, The Cost Structure of Consumer Finance Companies and Its
Implications for Interest Rates: Evidence from the Federal Reserve Board’s 2015 Survey of Finance Companies, BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RSRV. (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/fedsnotes/the-cost-structure-of-consumer-finance-companies-and-its-implications-for-interest-rates20200812.htm [https://perma.cc/U8WM-2MGY].
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See id.
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The final key component of the proposed FedLoans program is
widespread availability. Undocumented immigrants are frequently
targeted by payday lenders and often rely on alternative financing.192
Like the typical payday loan customer, undocumented immigrants are,
on average, employed but have low to moderate incomes.193 Further,
undocumented immigrants are unlikely to seek legal protection for fear
of deportation. 194 These factors combine to make undocumented
immigrants attractive customers for payday lenders. Cities across the
United States have recognized this problem and created “alternative ID”
for non-U.S. citizens and undocumented immigrants to facilitate their
participation in the traditional financial sector. 195 Although such
programs have achieved measurable levels of success, they have yet to be
implemented nationwide. Enabling widespread access to FedLoans could
balance non-U.S. citizens’ need for financial security with the Fed’s
interest in certifying consumers’ identification. Perhaps most
importantly, a FedLoans program could help the United States’ most
financially underserved population overcome financial impediments to
their full participation in society. 196
CONCLUSION
Payday loans provide important access to short-term credit that is
otherwise unavailable to under- and unbanked consumers. The
widespread use of payday loans suggests that there is demand for the
product, or for a similar product in the market. In fact, payday loans are
often less expensive than alternatives such as pawn shops or bank
overdraft fees. However, the current structure of payday loans is
indefensible. Borrowers often find themselves unable to meet basic
monthly expenses while simultaneously paying off the principal and
interest of the loan. This imbalance between assets and liabilities
generates a brutal cycle, as consumers repeatedly borrow at
extraordinarily high interest rates to make ends meet.
In an attempt to retain the benefits of short-term credit while
minimizing the damage caused by usurious interest rates and other
harmful practices of the payday loan industry, the CFPB proffered the
192. See generally Katherine Houren, Achieving the American Dream in Debt? Why the USA Patriot
Act Puts Undocumented Immigrants at Risk for Abuse by the Payday Loan Industry, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIV.
RTS. & SOC. JUST. 561 (2009).
193. Id. at 572.
194. Id. at 573.
195. Municipal ID Cards Help Undocumented Residents, Boost Local Economies, POLICYLINK,
https://www.policylink.org/blog/municipal-id-cards [https://perma.cc/2KK6-ST47].
196. See Nathalie Martin, Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due: What We Can Learn from the Banking
and Credit Habits of Undocumented Immigrants, 2015 MICH. STATE L. REV. 989 (2015).
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2017 Rule. This Rule aimed to prevent creditors from lending to
consumers who could not afford to repay the loan and to limit lenders’
ability to make repeated attempts to withdraw repayment from
borrowers’ accounts. As discussed throughout this Note, the 2017 Rule
has barely survived an onslaught of attacks, with the remaining
Payments Provisions currently under scrutiny in the Fifth Circuit.
Ordinarily, the CFPB’s failure would leave regulation up to each
individual state. But recent developments in court and at federal
agencies may make states unable to effectively regulate payday loans.
Unsupervised and unconstrained payday lenders may represent the
worst possible outcome for consumers. To compete in the short-term
credit market, payday lenders need only be the best of bad options for
consumers; as long as payday loans continue to dominate the
alternatives in the short-term lending market, the market is unlikely to
yield favorable outcomes for underbanked consumers.
The federal government must act both to prevent harm to existing
consumers and to proactively protect consumer access to short-term
credit. First, Congress should enact a federal usury rate for payday
loans. Second, to avoid a gap in services, the Federal Reserve should use
the layered technology of FedNow and FedAccounts to offer real-time,
low-interest, short-term loans directly to consumers.
Preserving access to short-term credit is vital to moving individuals
who historically have been excluded from traditional banking services
toward financial inclusion. Our proposal not only facilitates access to
short-term credit but improves the status quo. By treating payday loans
as a public service provided by the Federal Reserve, all U.S. residents
will be able to access real-time payments to help make ends meet,
without the fear of exploitative interest rates or harmful practices. In
turn, a short-term credit option at the federal level may work to break
the vicious cycle of debt that many underbanked consumers currently
face. In an environment where federal attempts fail and state
regulations are in danger, harm prevention is not enough. We must
capitalize on every tool possible to reduce consumer debt.

